Turkey – the Bosporus Conundrum

By: Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis
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[ Posted On: 2008-04-21 ]

With the exception of the speechless majority of the population, almost all in Turkey seem to have been taken by a whirlwind of madness. This confusing development was not necessarily expected, even before a year when the ongoing severe constitutional crisis was first fomented. As, quarrel after quarrel, antagonism after antagonism, and animosity after animosity, things get out of control, the most probable result can already been discerned; it will be too bad for all factors and factions of today's Conundrum in the Bosporus.

Yet, the situation, observed from far, seems so clear; last year's electoral result reconfirmed the fact that a great number of Turks has not taken the AK (Justice and Development) Party seriously. The ruling Islamist party became thus the voice of protestation against all the problems and malfunctions of the Turkish society that did not catch up fast (or as fast as it could) with the era of globalism and multiculturalism. As a protestation movement, the AK Party functioned as a multi-collective melting pot whereby – in the name of change, progress and prosperity – you enter white and get out black or vice versa.

Few perceived the real threat for a modern, progressive, democratic (although somewhat autocratic), and secular society like Turkey; the real threat can be mainly identified with the phenomenon of osmosis caused because of the socioeconomic, political, and cultural amalgamation of various people of different backgrounds and ideas.

When a politically unacceptable party becomes acceptable through the bias of protestation against a certain number of problems, the unsuspicious businessmen, politicians, statesmen, intellectuals, technocrats and academia who join this party are deprived of the necessary reflex and alarm system that functions automatically when red lines are crossed.

The non Islamist Turks, who found in the AK Party a possible tool for a necessary change, did not realize that the partners they chose had serious and secret objectives that diverged tremendously from theirs. Even worse, these non Islamist Turks failed to anticipate that, due to the process of amalgamation and cooperation on commonly accepted projects in the beginning, a change would occur in themselves, and that they would not be able to stick to their initial ideological position, finally ending up in an impasse and with a very confused mindset.

These non Islamist Turks failed to understand that this unfortunate development would occur to them at a moment their – uneducated, lower, but certainly not naïve – partners would have already advanced their secret agenda, which would have been viewed as absolutely impermissible by the non Islamist Turks in the very beginning.

In fact, what happened already in Turkey at the social level is what had happened at the political level to Kerensky a few days before the October Revolution in Russia or to Banisadr of Iran a few weeks before his escapade to Turkey and thence to France.

To give an example, Islamist gangs already bully the free citizens of Turkey when walking in the streets, when spending time in the beach, when speaking their minds about religion, and the non Islamist businessmen, politicians, statesmen, intellectuals, technocrats and academia, who are still allied with the AK Party, do not react.

The degradation of the Turkish social life is ostensible; proceeding with the same pace, the developments (all ensuing from AK Party's secret agenda) will bring forth a drastic imposition of the Islamic veil (hedjab) – and plenty of other points of the Islamist agenda – when the present non Islamist allies of AK Party will have nothing to answer to an (ultimately unveiled as) Islamist premier calmly stating that the outright majority of the country's population supports these changes.

This will happen within 5 to 7 years; when the disreputable and criminal pseudo-premier of Turkey promises not to introduce a law for formal imposition of the hedjab or for the institutionalization of Friday as non-working day (instead of Sunday), he tells the truth.

Simply this is half the truth; the other half is that his social pressure gangs work ceaselessly to monstrously transform, transfigure and alter the face and the nature of the Turkish society – an endeavour in which they face no opposition at all.

When the work will be completed, the majority of the meanwhile extensively bullied Turkish society will demand the introduction of the law, which will merely consecrate what will be the average practice by then. The intimidated non Islamist businessmen, politicians, statesmen, intellectuals, technocrats and academia will be confined into total impossibility to react, and gradually will move to Europe and America. Thus, the Islamic Republic of Turkey will be a reality, a dream come true to some, a nightmare impossible to prevent for others.

The Troublesome Factors of the Bosporus Conundrum

As the situation builds, it would be interesting to examine how different troublesome factors contribute altogether to further deterioration.

Turkey's president and premier are not Turks; to say the least, they are Arabic speaking, besotted minds, similar to those of the lewd and barbaric pseudo-presidents and bogus-kings of the Ottoman provinces that after the end of WW I were under British of French mandate.

In fact, there is no difference between Abdullah Gul and Algeria's Bouteflika or between Recep Erdogan and Iraq's Nouri Al Maliki. Perhaps this statement may not be clear to some.

1. AK Party, A. Gul, and R. Erdogan

What were the differences between President Turgut Ozal and the various presidents of the Arabic speaking countries? What were the dissimilarities between Turkish premiers, like Bulent Ecevit and Suleyman Demirel, and the endless numbers of the permanently replaced and easily replaceable prime ministers of the Arabic speaking countries?

The differences between the aforementioned statesmen reflect the dissimilarities existing between the average Turks and the average Arabic speaking plebs; it is the divide between independent country and colonized territory, educated and ignorant masses, discipline and disorder, impermeability and permeability, impenetrability and penetrability, statesmen who decide and implement, even when great powers and superpowers disagree, and farcical leaders who oscillate between servility publicized as moderate profile and idiotic haughtiness described as leadership value.

The difference between Turkey and the chaotic and disparate periphery of the so-called Arabic speaking countries is not either linguistic or religious. I mean that the linguistic difference plays a minimal role only. It is mainly behavioural, social, educational and social. It is the difference between a country, a people and a leader, who are self-confident and are able to implement all changes according to a holistic national design based on national self-knowledge and correct perception of their genuine identity, and a country made of people eager to imitate acts of foreigners, without understanding the principles existing behind the original acts.

When one person's servility toward foreigners is overwhelming, his duplication of their acts bears the stamp of an educational and cultural system which has been designed by foreigners (colonials) in order to produce two extremes, namely

a) an altered person who tries to get full recognition from the part of the foreigners by reproducing acts without understanding all the related principles, and

b) a fanaticized, aggressive, vulgar and lewd person.

Wherever we meet a situation like this, we know that we are not in Turkey but in one of the formerly colonized territories.

Not a single foreigner was allowed to move unaccompanied in Central and Eastern Turkey at the times of Kemal Ataturk. Contrarily to that, in the detached Ottoman territories that, through grave historical falsifications and monstrous cultural deformations, turned out to become the so-called Arabic speaking countries, English, French, Italians, Germans, Americans and others moved free and without any control, corrupted the indigenous peoples in various ways, established pseudo-schools to spoil minds and attitudes of the local elites' children, and finally triggered a reaction against these 'westernized' elites from the part of those whom the Paris and London universities had already 'revolutionized' according to alien, Western, patterns (only to make them deliberately fail); finally, they easily bought up the local economies. Anyone who would overreact to this situation would find his path leading to disaster.

All this means nothing to the alien president and premier of Turkey; their minds are programmed and tuned to the false Islam of our days, which has nothing to do with the historical and terminated Islam of the past but was machinated in the perverse laboratories of Paris and London, and then projected among the colonized peoples in order to engulf them into a permanent confusion, complete lack of identity, and extremism. What Kemal Ataturk was able to ostracize from Turkey Gul and Erdogan accepted, believed and attempt now to diffuse throughout Turkey in order to make of the Middle East's only independent country a tool for manipulation, like Iran, Pakistan or Egypt.

2. CHP, MHP, and their leaders

Although AK Party, Erdogan and Gul provenly represent a threat for Turkey's existence, the opposition leaders seem to have no real plan about how to overthrow AK Party from power. Their position reflects a very classical style of conventional opposition which would be normal if the ruling party accepted the rules of the game and respected the laws, the constitution, and the principles that helped formulate the entire legislation. However, this is not the case.

CHP leader Deniz Baykal expresses his terms in a very marked way, that's true, but this again is not the opposition needed to contain and outfox the lawless ruling party. Even worse, MHP leader Bahceli attempted to eventually cooperate with AK Party and Erdogan.

This is an incredible naivety; it can be interpreted as an effort from the part of the MHP leader to pull AK Party and Erdogan closer to MHP positions. This means that the MHP leader is convinced that the AK Party have no secret plans and no Islamist agenda for Turkey. This assumption is gravely wrong.

If we examine Deniz Baykal's stance across the board, we realize that he perceives the anti-AK Party opposition as a mobilization of the state institutions. This is a tragic mistake. Never did a state mechanism prevent a people, large masses, from achieving political power in the long run.

Over the past five years of AK Party rule, Baykal's CHP appealed 120 times to the Constitutional Court against laws adopted by Parliament. Since the AK Party won the July 2007, the CHP has challenged seven laws and constitutional amendments. These are: the amendment that removes a ban on the Muslim headscarf on university campuses, the Foundations Law, a law that would allow for the building of nuclear reactors, the witness protection law, changes made to the law on prosecutors and judges, and changes to the Turkish Penal Code (TCK).

Governmental circles commenting on the stance raise the issue of CHP responsibility for the financial cost of these efforts, particularly if the appeal concerned laws that had been proposed with respect to sales of state property. This comment is irrelevant, but in itself it highlights the futile character of the opposition.

To adequately limit, contain, and dethrone AK Party, CHP and MHP have to mobilize the people; instead of submitting some papers in a court, be it the Constitutional Court, and passively waiting the verdict, Baykal should explain, analyze, and mobilize masses. These cases can mobilize the voters of the four top parties of the opposition that total as many voters as AK Party. Even more importantly, a public debate against the effort to sell valuable state property (like forest land, estimated at US $ 25 billion, which would be later found in the hands of foreigners who would not bother much if the forest lands were burnt out) would help mobilize former AK Party voters who are able to realize that their favorite party is not as innocent, transparent, and ethical as they had originally thought.

This should be the epicenter of the anti-Islamist effort; approximately 20% of the Turkish voters have been deceived by the soft language spoken by AK Party's representatives. More the islamization process advances, harder this soft language will turn. Deniz Baykal's only chance lies in the method by which he will be able to awake, alert, and ultimately disentangle these Turks from the AK Party.

However, instead of this, Deniz Baykal gets involved in counterproductive disputes with the army (about Iraq) and the Business Circle (about CHP unacceptably non-updated economic policy and vision).

3. The Business Circle – TUSIAD

Over the years, TUSIAD (the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) has become one of Turkey's most respected and powerful institutions. More recently, in a press release, TUSIAD demanded from the French government to stop and obliterate its overtly anti-Turkish policies (http://www.tusiad.us/specific_page.cfm?CONTENT_ID=726).

More importantly, TUSIAD issued an unequivocal press release to underscore its dedication to Turkey's secular and democratic values and principles. Issued on January 30 (http://www.tusiad.us/specific_page.cfm?CONTENT_ID=739), the press release used very strong terms, as highlighted in the hereby selected excerpt:

"However, we feel that this issue has been brought forth prematurely without seeking compromise on a larger scale. The timing of this initiative also poses additional complications when the economy is slowing and unemployment is increasing. It is difficult to understand how this issue has become the country's number one priority over the economy.

TUSIAD has consistently advocated for Turkey's interests in line with her democratic and secular nature, which are indispensable characteristics of the Turkish Republic. We will continue to voice our opinions regarding any issue we feel may be a threat to these values”.

However, TUSIAD is characterized by an inexplicably uni-dimensional approach to, and perception of, the issue of Turkey's eventual adhesion to the EU. A big country like Turkey certainly has chances on different geo-strategic projects and backgrounds.

Despite the fact that Turkey's adhesion to the EU would not have only positive impact on the Turkish economy, TUSIAD failed to deliver a serious study of the political challenges related to Turkey's eventual adhesion to the EU. Yet, no one expects France to change a deep seated anti-Turkish feeling that contributed to the formation of Paris Oriental policies. What will happen when under any pretext, real or not, France will attempt to block Turkey's adhesion? Another press release?

I find it difficult to believe that people with the education, the formation, the entrepreneurial experience, and the global vision of the TUSIAD board of directors find it reasonable to open a representative office in Beijing and not in Tashkent, Baku or Astana. Before any diplomat, statesman or geo-strategic expert establishes Turkey's Drang nach Osten, TUSIAD should have articulated the only real vision for Turkey in the 21st century: From Istanbul to Karachi and Astana, the Islamic, Secular, Liberal, Democratic Eurasia.

4. The Military

Custodians of the values and principles of the Republic, as established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as a secular and laic state, the military played a significant role in the Turkish politics. Last year, a warning statement made it clear the Turkish Armed Forces stood ready to intervene if the secular nature of the Turkish Constitution were compromised; to refer to an excerpt, "the Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. Their loyalty to this determination is absolute”.

In the present social, political, and ideological ordeal, Turkey's armed forces remain the strongest element that would oppose an abyssmal avalanche towards an ominous Islamic Republic of Turkey. But 2008 is not 1980. Of course, an intervention can take many forms; the question is which form would be successful in today's global world.

Other issues seem to be related to the subject. What if US and European centers of power opposed an attempt of this kind? What if Turkey's effort to adhere to the EU received a definite blow, as a consequence of the 'intervention'?

In an interconnected, global world, little matters whether the Turkish armed forces interfere directly or indirectly (by impeaching the government, and the ruling party) in the politics.

Little matters whether the motion filed by Chief Prosecutor at the High Court of Appeals Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya is based on solid grounds and conclusive evidence; a decision by the Constitutional Court to disband the AK Party and ban from politics 71 of its members (president and prime minister included) will become a controversial issue and certainly trigger prearranged reactions.

Conclusion

Even these reactions matter relatively little; what matters is the following:

1. Turkey will find itself in a completely different landscape after this development. What fundamental geo-strategic preparations have been made and considerations examined and /or shaped as regards Turkey's choices after this development?

2. Turkey's terminated candidacy will fuel anger and anti-Turkish feelings in Europe; one should expect a more rigid stance against Turkey's interests to be taken by France, England, Germany and the US. An immediate 'answer' may come with the further exploitation of the ridiculous, political and non historical, affair of the so-called Armenian Genocide. On the other hand, Barzani's gangsters will suddenly get a lot of ammunitions that they will feel obliged to share with PKK. What will be Turkey's answer?

The two aforementioned points are indicative; there may be five, ten, twenty. It will be terribly disastrous for Turkey to confront them on a case per case method. It will simply prove impossible to be done.

Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya's motion is right and well-documented; however, what will truly justify and reconfirm its validity is a new vision for Turkey that will be completely different from the long pursued European chimera, definitely viable, and perfectly equivalent to the vocation of the Oriental State.

Article Source: http://www.afroarticles.com/article-dashboard

About The Author: Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis - is Orientalist, Assyriologist, Egyptologist, Iranologist, Islamologist, Historian and Political Scientist. Dr. Megalommatis, 51, is the author of 12 books, dozens of scholarly articles, hundreds of encyclopedia entries, and thousands of articles. He speaks, reads and writes more than 15, modern and ancient, languages.

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