Senlis Council Report on Somalia – A Controversial, Yet Influential Document

By: Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis

[ Posted On: 2008-07-28 ]

Many times the reality can be double; this does not change in anything the original truth of a fact, an event or a situation, but conditions it on the way it is perceived. Allover the world is the same; it can be the case of a person or the status of a society; it can concern a nation and a state or simply a political leader and a statesman.

The same concerns Somalia; one fact is the down-to-earth reality that the Somalis have lived day by day for no less than 17 years. Another layer of reality is how Somalia is perceived by others. The interaction between the two layers hinges on

1. how Somali politicians and statesmen try to influence the second layer by employing persuasive methods to eliminate the difference between the two layers of reality, and

2. how other groups of interest (and/or states) try to promote their agendas by falsifying (deliberately or not) the original truth.

In politics, it must be always understood that not only persuasion but also misperception is power.

In this article, I republish the main part of the Senlis Council Report on Somalia. After the Executive Summary (published in a previous article: ‘Senlis Council Report – US sponsorship of a proxy Christian army – ´Ethiopia´: a Failure’ /
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/69573), and the present part, I will republish all the other parts of the Report, reserving space for many comments, refutations and rectifications in independent articles. I welcome your input, as the Report is expected to function as catalyst for impending developments in the Horn of Africa, and commentaries have to be published.

I call on your perspicacious reading for the subtle is at times geared to create greater momentum or to hint at critical yet unsaid points; is it for instance mere coincidence that the Report features a diagram (Who is who in Somalia) atop of which the three levels (with title and subtitles) are coloured in the three colours of the …. flag of Abyssinia (fallaciously re-baptized ‘Ethiopia’) – simply in reverse order (from top to bottom: Dark Red, Yellow, Green)?

In this way, with the upper layer (“Who is who in Somalia: A Political Guide to key Stakeholders”) in dark red, with the middle layer (“National Level”) in yellow, and with the lower layer (“Transitional Federal Government”) in green, we get the impression that Senlis Council’s (implicit) view is that Somalia should be a reflection or a mirror of Abyssinia. This is precisely what happens now; without many realizing it. But the Senlis Council understands it very well.

The Report’s Part on Somalia – the Chapters
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/chronic_failures_war_terror/somalia

Part A: Somalia

1. Somalia Conflict History

2. Dynamics of the Current Political Situation in Somalia

2.1 Recent Developments

2.2 Conflict Dynamics

2.3 Dynamics of the Humanitarian situation in Somalia

3. Comparison of Somalia Conflict Dynamics to Afghanistan

1. Somalia Conflict History
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/chronic_failures_war_terror/somalia/conflict_history

Somalia's recent history has been marked by instability, dictatorship and disintegration. Although the country democratically elected its first President in 1960, the government was soon overthrown by the regime of Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, who imposed a dictatorship which lasted until 1991. In the absence of a functioning central government for over 17 years, Somalia has been ravaged by sweeping conflict and has experienced an endemic humanitarian crisis. Throughout this period, Somalia has struggled to remain united. In May 2001, north-western Somalia unilaterally declared itself independent as the Republic of Somaliland. Three years earlier, in August 1998, the north-eastern Puntland State of Somalia was established as a self-governing entity, seeking to become part of a federated Somalia at a later stage.

An ongoing struggle to establish a central government

In efforts to resolve the political differences and establish a credible and effective central government, at least fifteen national reconciliation conferences have been convened since 1991. The thirteenth such effort, held in Djibouti in 2000, resulted in the formation of a Transitional National Government (TNG). Nonetheless, this new national government was incapable of establishing itself beyond parts of the capital city of Mogadishu, and its three-year mandate expired in summer 2003.

Emergence of the Transitional Federal Government and the Islamic Courts Union
In 2004, another national reconciliation conference held in Kenya led to the creation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), whose official aim is to bring peace and security in the country. The Transitional Federal Charter provides a transitory legal basis for the interim five-year government – comprising a President, the Prime Minister, and cabinet – and calls for a new constitution and a nation-wide poll.

High expectations of stability and progress in Somalia following the TFG’s creation failed to materialise: in June 2006 the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) defeated the US-backed coalition of warlords which had been established as an instrument of counter-terrorism policy. The ICU then extended its authority to the central and south regions of the country, rendering the TFG ineffective.

Ethiopian intervention in support of the Transitional Federal Government
In December 2006, in what was widely perceived to be an opportunity to force durable stability in Somalia, Ethiopian troops intervened in the country and together with TFG forces, ousted the ICU from areas in the south and central regions, allowing the TFG to gain control of Mogadishu. On 20 January 2008, the TFG relocated from the south-eastern town of Baidoa to the capital city of Mogadishu, with a pledge of national reconciliation and desperately-needed stability.

In Frame:

“Before the Ethiopian invasion, Somalia was in hell. Somalia needs help preparing its security forces, and then Ethiopia can leave. The United Nations cannot do anything here, but the Ethiopians know Somalia. Others do not.”

Government supporter
Mogadishu, March 2008

Insurgency activities increasing: the return of the ICU and rise of Al-Shabab However, once again expectations and promises have fallen short. The intervention of a foreign military and the reinstatement of the TFG have led to frequent and large-scale conflict between anti-government forces and government troops. ICU remnants and clan militias have repeatedly challenged the authority and legitimacy of the TFG, and resisted the foreign occupation of the country. Deadly clashes have recently escalated, leading to widespread chaos and lawlessness.

In Frame:

“Force is being used as first resort rather than last resort.”
“In Somalia, and in Mogadishu, the one who has the gun, he’s the boss.”

Identities withheld
Mogadishu, March 2008

In Frame:
Somalia Conflict History at a Glance
Dates and Events

2. Dynamics of the Current Political Situation in Somalia
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/chronic_failures_war_terror/somalia/conflict_dynamics

Shifting alliances and rivalries

The political situation in Somalia remains multifaceted and constantly changeable. Following the 17-year absence of a credible and functioning central government, a number of national players have striven to garner popular support by opposing foreign interference in the country and criticising the TFG for its lack of accountability. A political Islamic movement has already emerged in Somalia whilst an extremist movement is currently surfacing. Notably, opposition to the government is not homogenous. The dynamics and relationships between the main political players and armed groups are mercurial, with allies often quickly becoming rivals.

Clans: Somalia’s complex political framework

Somalia’s strong social structures also play an important part in the country’s political processes. Somalia is a lineage-based society where clan affiliation is a complex yet principle source of identity and security. In the context of Somalia’s current situation of lawlessness, these social units have been mobilised and represent a dominant political dynamic at the local and national level. Somali clans and sub-clans have neither a unified nor a consistent stance on current Somali politics. Even those clans that accept the authority of the TFG may actively oppose it on certain issues and build coalitions with other groups.

Somali politics marked by international involvement

At the same time, international stakeholders continue to intervene in the country, including through military support of opposing groups, to exert influence over Somalia’s future. Neighbouring countries and the United States have intervened in the country, either in an attempt to gain a regional stronghold or as part of the global War on Terror. In contrast, the United Nations has sought to bring about stability in the country by mobilising the African Union, and promoting a genuine conciliatory political process between all Somali parties.

In Frame:

“The great majority in Somalia want peace but there are some who are heavily invested in the violence and do not want a stable government in place, as it would remove power and economic wealth from them. They will attend the peace talks to put on a show but will ensure that peace is never possible.”

Businessman
Mogadishu, March 2008

In Frame:
Who is who in Somalia: A Political Guide to key Stakeholders (brief notes in guise of profiles)

• National Level

• Transitional Federal Government

• President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed

• Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein

• Speaker of Parliament Sheikh Adan Muhammad Nur (Adan Madobe)

Autonomous Regions

• Somaliland

• Dahir Rayale Kahin

• Puntland

• Muhammad Muse Xirsi (Adde)

Warlords

• Mayor of Mogadishu Muhammad Umar Habib (Dheere)

• Militia Leader Abdi Hasan Awale Qeyboiid

International Level

• United Nations

• Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Somalia

• Ahmedou Ould Abdallah

• African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

USA

US State Department

• Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

• US Ambassador to Kenya Michael Ranneberger

• Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer

• Deputy Assistant Secretary James Swan

US State of Defense

• Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff -- Admiral Michael Mullan

• Undersecretary of Defense James Clapper

• Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Theresa Whelan

• Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF HOA) -- Rear Admiral James Hart

Ethiopia -- Meles Zenawi

Eritrea -- Prsedient Isaias Afewerki

Opposition / Insurgent Groups

Supreme Council of Islamic Courts SCIC of Islamic Union

• Al Shabab

• Leader Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed

• Senior Commander Aden Hashi Farah (Ayrow)

• Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys

• Mukhtar Robow (Abu Mansoor)

• Hassan Abdullah Hersi Al – Turki

Al Qaeda Operatives in East Africa

• Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan

• Fazul Abdallah Mohammed (Harun Fazul)

• Issa Osman Issa

• Abu Talha Al Sudani

2.1 Recent Developments
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/chronic_failures_war_terror/somalia/recent_developments

Appointment of new Prime Minister and Cabinet

2007 marked political crises that led to the resignation of the former Prime Minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi, and the appointment of a new cabinet. Under a clan power-sharing deal announced in November 2007, President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, from the Darood clan, appointed respected Hawiye clan figure Nur Hassan Hussein as Prime Minister. The TFG is currently dominated by the Darood/Majerteen, Hawiye/Abgal and Rahanwhein clans and sub-clans. The Hawiye clan holds the greatest influence in the capital Mogadishu. After the Majerteen, the Rahanwein reportedly comprise the second largest clan grouping in the TFG army.

In Frame:
“The government must be a government for everyone, not just those that support the government.”
Government Representative
Mogadishu, March 2008

In response to public criticisms regarding the formation and quality of the cabinet, and considering the recommendations of the National Reconciliation Congress, the newly appointed Prime Minister appointed a new cabinet with members chosen from both within and outside parliament. Prime Minister Hussein’s efforts to establish a government of national unity, to reach out to rival groups and engage with all Somalis were regarded as a renewed opportunity for a peaceful transition to a democratic regime. Nonetheless, internal divisions, a lack of transparency and power rivalry have hindered these efforts and continue to thwart the authority and legitimacy of the TFG.

As the TFG’s five-year mandate draws to a close in 2009, the chances of the TFG holding national elections to establish a functioning Somali state and a permanent government look increasingly bleak. Public disillusionment over the lack of national unity and the TFG’s broken promises is growing; the TFG’s inaction over insecurity is pushing people toward more radical positions as a matter of survival.

Failed attempts at national reconciliation

Since the fall of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991, at least 15 national reconciliation conferences have been convened, each seeking to resolve the internal political differences and establish a credible and effective central government.

In Frame:
Major National reconciliation conferences since 1991

The most recent National Reconciliation Conference was held in July-August 2007. The international community expressed its broad support for this attempt, providing USD 8 million through United Nations Development Program to strengthen the capacity of its independent oversight body, the National Governance and Reconciliation Committee.

While the conference resulted in key resolutions aimed at resolving the conflict, efforts proved to be restricted by the lack of participation of several important opposition parties. Accordingly, the groups not involved in the discussions denounced the resolutions.

Prime Minister urging dialogue with all parties

The inability to secure the involvement, purposefully or not, of all parties in the reconciliation process was depicted as the key impediment to Somalia’s stability by the new Prime Minister Hussein. His efforts for political reconciliation focused on addressing the failure to engage all opposition groups, promising to talk to all Somali groups without precondition and releasing political prisoners. The Prime Minister’s declaration of an unconditional offer to engage in dialogue with opposition forces has triggered increased consultation with these groups, raising hopes for a political resolution. The Somali public welcomed these confidence-building steps and urged the Prime Minister to build on this positive momentum.

However, the Prime Minister’s attempts were faced strong resistance from within the TFG and from its international partners, primarily the US. President Abdullahi Yusuf has often undercut the Prime Minister and sought to obstruct talks with those he labels radical Islamists. The internal backlash was illustrated in February 2008, when TFG security forces launched an attack in Bakara market, where the armed opposition had dominated. It is believed that the incident aimed to block the emerging alliance between moderate opposition forces and the Prime Minister.

In Frame:
“The Prime Minister’s efforts should be supported. Everyone supports him no matter what clan or political interest. The only people who don’t actually support him is the President himself, and the Ethiopians. He is just one man, and deserves the support of everyone who wants peace.”

Elder
Mogadishu, March 2008

Transitional Federal Government lacks credibility and legitimacy

It has become increasingly apparent that the TFG is little more than a loose assembly of frequently competing individuals, lacking transparency and credibility. Efforts to establish a government of national unity have been faced with strong resistance by those TFG members who believe that a genuine reconciliation process is not in their interest. Prime Minister Hussein has promised to talk to the opposition without precondition and has actively supported the engagement of all Somalis regardless of their political affiliation. His decision to release some of Mogadishu’s elders and journalist detainees in January 2008 and to promote an inclusive political process was welcomed by the UN and the majority of Somalis.

In contrast, President Abdullahi Yusuf’s tone is less conciliatory and more militaristic, allowing personal agendas within the TFG to derail political resolution. Reports of TFG soldiers engaging in widespread looting combined with poor governance and increased insecurity have further compromised the President’s authority.

“The government forces are hyenas wearing shoes.”
“The government forces are basically out of control bandits.”

Identities withheld
Mogadishu, March 2008

Although Prime Minister Hussein appears vulnerable with no control over the TFG’s finances and security forces, the Somali public respects and endorses his efforts. Within a government that lacks cohesion and is regarded by its people as increasingly illegitimate, only the prime minister’s credibility and popularity continues to rise.

Opposition remains fragmented

Similar to the TFG’s lack of cohesion, opposition based inside and outside Somalia is not homogenous. Some opposition groups appear more moderate and have responded to the calls for political dialogue and reconciliation.

In contrast, others have espoused a belligerent approach toward the transitional government. The Eritrea-based umbrella organisation Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) headed by the ICU leader Sheikh Ahmed and former parliamentary speaker Sharif Hassan, who chairs the ARS Central Committee. The ARS represents the most powerful opposition group comprised of ousted Islamists and fairly moderate ICU members, former parliamentarians, civil society including business people, and the diaspora. The Alliance was officially formed during an opposition conference attended by 200 delegates, which was held in Asmara, Eritrea in September 2007. The balance between the ICU and parliamentary groups is central to the political identity and character of the ARS. Radical ICU leader Aweys also attended the conference but rejected claims he holds a formal position in the Alliance. Notably, the Alliance has influence primarily within the Hawiye community though, even within this group, there are divisions.

Some elements of the ARS have exploited the recent US designation of Al-Shabab as a terrorist group to further distance themselves from Al-Shabab, and portray themselves as a legitimate opposition to the TFG.

Selective Excerpt In Frame:
International Crisis Group on the current situation in Somalia

Insurgency rife

In addition to the various stakeholders, including former members of the Somali Transitional Federal Parliament, members of the Somali diaspora and clan elders, there are also a number of armed insurgent groups. The armed opposition is being waged primarily by four groups: ICU forces loyal to the ARS; ICU forces acting independently of the ARS; clan militias (including some secular nationalists); and the more radical Al-Shabab which aims to establish a regional caliphate. In contrast, ICU remnants aim to regain control in Somalia and call for jihad to expel Ethiopian troops from Somalia.

Public support for these groups is not directly related to the groups’ ideology but instead to what is perceived to be their contribution to Somalia’s liberation efforts. In particular, hard-line ICU elements enjoy growing popular support and reportedly receive funding from local businessmen, especially following the Bakara market attacks. Although many businesses seek the restoration of peace and security, Hawiye businessmen in particular perceive (with considerable justification) the TFG to be hostile to their interests. As such, businessmen are becoming important security actors: their private security forces represent some of the largest armed militias, particularly in Mogadishu. The Bakara militia has reportedly been functioning well and has brought a degree of security to one of Mogadishu’s most violent areas. There has been some degree of communication between the different insurgent groups; however, tensions and power struggles remain dominant.

In Frame:
“The designation of Al-Shabab as terrorists is outrageous. They are resistance fighters!”

Identity withheld
Mogadishu, March 2008

Incoherent international stance on Somalia

Neighbouring countries, foreign powers and international organisations have sought to promote a particular course of action in Somalia. Whilst the UN Secretary-General through its Special Representative in Somalia has striven to support Prime Minister Hussein’s efforts at promoting genuine reconciliation in the country, other international partners have sought to obstruct this process and, instead, favour opposing stakeholders in the conflict. This lack of a unified international stance (and in fact an often conflicting international stance) on Somalia has exacerbated internal divisions and friction.

Neighbouring states and long-term adversaries Ethiopia and Eritrea have their own strategic agendas and are essentially conducting a proxy war in Somalia. Since its invasion in Somalia in December 2006 to back TFG forces against the then dominant ICU, Ethiopia has been supporting President Abdullahi Yusuf and maintains a substantial number of troops on Somali ground.

Eritrea has supported Somali opposition groups; the powerful Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia is based in the country and the Eritrean government has been accused of arming and financing the insurgency in Somalia. The rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea has contributed to undermining peacemaking efforts and further destabilising and weakening Somalia.

The US intervention in Somalia as part of its global War on Terror is also distinct from international and Prime Minister Hussein’s conciliatory efforts. The US is not only directly funding selective branches of the TFG but has recently also exerted pressure on Prime Minister Hussein to restrict the number of those with whom he was prepared to engage in dialogue, in an attempt to exclude individuals on the US list of designated terror suspects such as principal ICU figures Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys .

In another measure that undercut the Prime Minister and disrupted the reconciliation process with all opposition parties including radical Islamists, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated Al-Shabab a foreign terrorist organisation.

An issue of grave public concern pertinent to the TFG’s legitimacy is foreign intervention in the country and, particularly, the continuing presence of Ethiopian troops. The persistence of President Abdullahi Yusuf on this issue has not only hindered national unity, with the Somali public now increasingly viewing the TFG as a puppet regime guided by the interests of neighbouring countries and foreign powers, but has also led to frequent and large-scale conflict between anti-government forces and government troops. ICU remnants and clan militias resisting foreign intervention in Somalia are gaining increasing popular support and continually challenge the authority and legitimacy of the TFG. The TFG’s perceived dependence on neighbouring Ethiopia, the strong US influence and the president’s complicity in the foreign intervention have weakened severely the TFG’s credibility as a national entity.

In Frame:
“We are extremely disappointed by the role of the international community. There is lots of money for the war and none for the ordinary people.”

Identity withheld
Mogadishu, March 2008

In Frame:
“We are tired of incompetent Americans. Either both President Bush and his staff are really incompetent, or they intended to act in ways that spreads extremism in Somalia.”

Businessman
Mogadishu, March 2008

2.2 Conflict dynamics
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/chronic_failures_war_terror/somalia/dynamics

Somalia has been a de facto collapsed state for almost two decades. Efforts at political consolidation and stability have materialised, leading to the effect disintegration of the state. In the absence of credible and functioning government institutions, widespread disorder and insecurity have thrived, in turn allowing extremism to grow and international militant Islamists to use Somalia as a staging post. Somalia’s barely functioning transitional government has also permitted neighbouring countries and foreign powers to intervene, further undermining Somalia’s national unity and entrenching divisions.

A combination of unrelenting internal and external dynamics has aggravated security and living conditions in Somalia. With millions of Somalis experiencing the catastrophic effect of this intractable and multifaceted conflict, hopes for a viable peaceful solution are becoming increasingly bleak.

In Frame:
“What is really striking about Somalia is the lack of engagement from the International Community: ‘don’t want to know, it’s too difficult, we don’t have the capacity, someone else should deal with it’.”

Member of the international community
Nairobi, March 2008

Primacy of clan affiliation

The traditional Somali society is primarily lineage-based with clan affiliation being a principle source of identity. Seventeen years of disorder and a flagging sense of national unity have allowed clans and sub-clans to mobilise and become the dominant political factor at the local and national level, providing the basis for human security. Their political primacy over the moderate practice of Sufi Islam has also been palpable, with Sufi brotherhoods often complementing the clan dominance. Notably, clans and sub-clans have control over different regions and cities in Somalia; the Hawiye clan holds the greatest influence in the capital Mogadishu whilst the Ayr sub-clan controls most of Galguduud and the Lower Shabelle region. Conversely, the Darood/Marehan sub-clan controls mainly the Gedo region and the town of Kismayo.

Somali clans and sub-clans do not share a unified political stance and, though they can be conducive to Somalia’s political reconciliation, they can equally prove to be the most important spoilers in the reconciliation process.

In Frame:
“The clans can be a force for good or for bad. The bad aspects are the revenge killings, the forced marriages, and the violence. But in rural areas, the clans provide social cohesion and support systems.”

Elder
Mogadishu, March 2008

The TFG is dominated by the Darood/Majerteen, Hawiye/Abgal and Rahanwein clans and sub-clans, and also includes several warlords and factional elements aligned with the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council. This alignment with the TFG, however, is not consistent and there are sub-clans that have actively opposed the transitional government on certain issues and have built coalition with opposition groups. For instance, though the Darood / Marehan sub-clan declares its loyalty to the TFG, the group has control over the Kismayo town, which is currently in a state of rebellion and had recently driven TFG forces out of the town. Conversely, the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts is primarily dominated by the Hawiye clan, though no longer clearly led by the Ayr sub-clan. Parts of the Hawiye clan are considered central to Somalia’s conflict and, as such, encompassing these groups within a genuine reconciliation process would be instrumental to building lasting peace.

In Frame
Major Somali Clans and Sub-clans (diagram)

Steady flow of arms into Somalia

In January 1992, the UN Security Council, alarmed at the rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia and concerned that the continuation of the conflict is a threat to international stability and peace, called on all states to refrain from any action conducive to increasing tension in Somalia, imposing an arms embargo upon the country (Resolution 733). In the years to come, notwithstanding proclamations to refrain from any action in contravention of the arms embargo, there have been continuing violations. Notably, arms shipments from Ethiopia to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Eritrea to Islamic militias respectively have continued, further impeding efforts to establish security in Somalia through a peaceful political settlement.

The UN Security Council has repeatedly condemned the significant increase in the flow of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia, calling primarily on regional states to take all necessary steps to hold violators accountable. In its Resolution 1724 (2006), the Security Council sought to further promote compliance by requesting the re-establishment of the Monitoring Group to investigate violations and to facilitate the implementation of the arms embargo; the Group, which also operated in 2004 and 2006, was re-established in July 2007 for a period of six months.

The Monitoring Group has identified a number of countries violating the arms embargo in Somalia – in addition to Ethiopia and Eritrea, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Uganda and Yemen were cited as violators.

Although the weapon markets were ostensibly shut down by the TFG, the trade has continued to flourish underground, and the main flow of arms into Somalia currently passes via Bosaso, the north-east port city nominally aligned with the TFG. Almost all weapons confiscated by the TFG and other militias are resold on the weapon markets in Mogadishu.

In recent months, prices for a lot of weapons have dropped significantly; for instance the price of a second-hand AK-47 was around USD 200 in May 2007 while field research conducted in March 2008 suggests this may now be as low as USD 150. Notably, the equivalent prices in Kandahar City and Lashkar Gah, the two cities in the southern part of Afghanistan where the Taliban insurgency is strongest, are USD 275 and USD 400 respectively.

In Frame:
Overview of estimated weapon and ammunition prices at the Bakara Arms Market (figures)

In Frame:
Human Rights Watch on the Current Situation in Somalia (excepts)

In Frame:
“People have fled; you cannot imagine the fighting we have seen”.

Elder
Mogadishu, March 2008

Foreign intervention undermining conciliatory efforts

Ongoing Ethiopian military action in Somalia

Ethiopia has striven to promote its own strategic agenda in Somalia, to offset the influence of its neighbouring adversary Eritrea, which has purportedly been arming and financing the insurgency in the country. The two countries are essentially conducting a proxy war in Somalia. By late 2006, Ethiopia had deployed up to 30,000 troops to Somalia in support of the TFG, to defend against the threat that Somali Islamist groups could pose to Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government attempts to conceal the financial and human costs of maintaining its military mission in Somalia, though it is reported that over 200 Ethiopian soldiers have been killed since their unofficial deployment in November 2006, and their subsequent official deployment in December 2006.

Four weeks after Ethiopia’s December 2006 intervention in Somalia, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi attempted to remove Ethiopian troops from the country, urging the African Union to support TFG security forces during the pull-out process. Nonetheless, so far, despite the presence of 2,400 Ugandan and Burundian African Union troops, several thousand Ethiopian troops are still operating in Somalia at an increasingly grave cost to both Ethiopia and Somalia. In particular, the continued presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia has undermined the TFG’s independence and credibility as a national entity.

The dynamics of the relationship between Ethiopia and the US also brings to light drivers behind Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia. The Ethiopian Government believes it has a lot to gain from its alliance with the US, especially regarding its rivalry with Eritrea and, thus, it has overall sought to keep its powerful ally content with its intervention in Somalia.

The Republican US Administration, for its part, considers Ethiopia’s contribution significant in fighting terrorism in Somalia and counter-balancing those regional countries which allow extremism to flourish. Although the US officially contributes only a fragment of Ethiopia’s defence budget, there has been speculation that it has helped pay for the rising costs of Ethiopia’s army and that the Pentagon wishes to make Ethiopia a bulwark in the region.

In Frame:
“The United States bringing Christian Ethiopians, who have been our enemies for centuries, in here to support a puppet government, is like putting the Jews in to run Palestine”.

Identity withheld
Mogadishu, March 2008

In Frame:
“The Government is in the hands of the Ethiopians, who for centuries have been the enemy of the Somali people. Ethiopia is controlling the situation in a way that is not acceptable to Somalis.”

Identity withheld
Mogadishu, March 2008

US interference in Somalia to fight terrorism

The US intervention in the Horn of Africa region - and Somalia in particular - is projected as part of its global War on Terror. With lawlessness and extremism thriving in Somalia, the country has been identified by the US as a safe haven for international terrorists. Accordingly, the US has recently unleashed a series of attacks targeting suspected Al-Qaeda operatives and training bases on Somali soil. As a result, numerous civilian casualties had been reported, fuelling public frustration against American intervention in the country as well as against the TFG for its complicity in the foreign interference.

In Frame:
Air strikes in Somalia (list)

In Frame:
“The psychological effect of the US bombings is very significant. Everyone is horrified by these actions. They cannot be justified. They never hit any bad people”.

Government supporter
Mogadishu, March 2008

In addition to its militarised intervention in Somalia, the US Administration has frustrated efforts to promote a genuine and all-inclusive reconciliation process in the country. The US has been directly funding selective departments of the TFG and has supported Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf in his efforts to undercut Prime Minister Hussein’s reconciliatory efforts. In February 2008, the US government disrupted negotiation talks with all opposition parties - including hardline Islamists - by exerting pressure on the prime minister to exclude certain groups and individuals from a reconciliation process, particularly those included in the US list of designated terror suspects.

Effectively sabotaging the prime minister’s efforts to reach out to radical elements, on 29 February 2008 - shortly before a US air strike near the Somali-Kenyan border - the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated Al-Shabab as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224. Even though Al-Shabab enjoys little public support in southern Somalia, the untimely announcement of the designation was criticised by Somali opposition groups and the wider public.

In Frame:
“The Shabab are a product of the United States’ policies here. They are a mirror image. If the United States and Ethiopia stay in the country the Shabab garden will grow. If they leave, Al-Shabab will not be necessary”.

Identity withheld
Mogadishu, March 2008

In Frame:
“The designation of Al-Shabab as terrorists completely undermined what the Prime Minister is trying to do: it really makes you doubt the US commitment to the reconciliation process”.

Landowner
Mogadishu, March 2008

In Frame:
In its statement which was released on 18 March 2008, the US State Department underlined that “Al-Shabab is a violent and brutal extremist group with a number of individuals affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Many of its senior leaders are believed to have trained and fought with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Al-Shabab has used intimidation and violence to undermine the Somali government and threatened civil society activists working to bring about peace through political dialogue and reconciliation. The group scattered leaflets on the streets of Mogadishu warning participants in last year’s reconciliation conference that they intended to bomb the conference venue. Al-Shabab promised to shoot anyone planning to attend the conference and to blow up delegates’ cars and hotels. Although Al-Shabab did not carry out these particular threats, the group has claimed responsibility for shooting Deputy District Administrators, as well as several bombings and shootings in Mogadishu targeting Ethiopian troops and Somali government officials. Al-Shabab’s leader, Aden Hashi Ayrow, has ordered his fighters to attack African Union (AU) troops based in Mogadishu. Ayrow has also called for foreign fighters to join Al-Shabab in their fight in Somalia. Given the threat that Al-Shabab poses, the designation will raise awareness of al-Shabab’s activities and help undercut the group’s ability to threaten targets in and destabilize the Horn of Africa region.”

Furthermore, as part of its strategy to reverse radicalisation and fight terrorism in the Horn of Africa region, the US Government considers Eritrea a pariah state, accusing its government of arming and financing the insurgency in Somalia. If the US insists on designating Eritrea as a “state sponsor of terrorism,” the dynamics within the Horn of Africa -particularly Ethiopia’s role- would change significantly and the task of achieving regional stability would become immeasurably more difficult.

In Frame:
“What the United States is doing in Somalia goes against all classic counter-insurgency principles and common sense. It is all based on Rumsfeld-style thinking about some sort of collective punishment for Somalia.”

Government Representative
Mogadishu, March 2008

Privatisation of security

Governments and civilians are increasingly turning to private military companies for security provision. There is considerable debate as to whether these can provide human security and stability in those areas where public institutions are weak, as in Somalia where private security companies have now been contracted to secure the city’s Bakara market. In the absence of strong regulation, private militias and security companies are unlikely to be held accountable for their actions and it is, therefore, doubtful these can increase public security in the long run.

In Somalia, police, military and justice institutions have not been restored to full working order since the fall of the state in 1991. While competing powers recruit militias, private businesses have also contracted private military companies both in order to access markets and to create secure trading areas and routes.

At present, Somali trade is primarily protected through private security groups. In Bakara market, where household goods and weapons lie side by side, traders have taken action following a series of fires and recent attacks. Local businessmen are funding a private military company to secure the market area. Some see traders and businessmen as potential spoilers, as their private security forces represent some of the largest militias, particularly in Mogadishu. The recent market attacks by TFG forces have created frustration amongst the business community and have pushed local businessmen further into the hands of hard-line ICU elements. Reportedly, the latter enjoy the growing support and receive funding from local businessmen.

In Frame:
“The private security companies are really just the business community’s militias.”

Government Representative
Mogadishu, March 2008

Locals have mixed reactions to this new development. Where there is no recourse to reliable public security, many see private companies and militias as the only viable solution. Others, however, feel it undermines the creation of legitimate security forces and amounts to protection racketeering.

In Frame:
From Rio de Janeiro to Mogadishu: Private Security Companies and Militias

Fierce competition for resources

Somalia, one of the poorest countries in the world, has been long suspected to be rich with natural resources, particularly gas and oil. These natural resources are thought to be concentrated in the Puntland peninsula in the north east of the country and to a smaller extent in the Ogaden desert. The struggle over natural resources is a cross-cutting issue both within the Somali conflict - at the tribal and institutional level, Puntland’s governance issue - and in the regional and international context.

Oil: Throughout the 17 years of disorder in Somalia, the conflict over the oil issue has intensified and the authority over oil exploration deals has highlighted the frailty of the transitional government and its dependency on warlords and feudal powers. Oil is also a stake in the international arena with the country’s potential oil industry attracting a number of international players. For instance, it is argued - though the US denied allegations - that the AMOCO, CONOCO and CHEVRON contracts in Somalia were a major consideration in the US intervention in Somalia in 1992. In recent years both China and Russia have been attempting to make deals with the Somali government for exploration purposes, whilst an Australian company is at the centre of the Puntland–Mogadishu dispute after the contract for exploration rights signed in 2005 is now contested by the TFG. Indonesian, Kuwaiti and Canadian oil companies have also negotiated deals over percentages of the Somalia Petroleum Corporation, creating further tensions. In the context of Somalia’s instability, international interest at this stage is more likely to exacerbate the conflict as opposed to fostering the economic development needed for the country’s recovery.

Water: Somalia is also facing fierce competition of another scarce resource: water. Receiving just 50 cm of water per year, Somalia suffers chronic water shortages. To date, fights between various sub-clans over water resources have resulted in considerable casualties. Decentralised traditional tribal negotiations for water sharing may be an appropriate way to resolve water conflicts between clans and sub-clans. Water is a factor of controversy also in the wider regional context, exacerbating rivalry with and between neighbouring countries Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Lack of government accountability

Public perceptions of the TFG’s legitimacy, fairness and accountability are central to Somalia’s conflict. The ICU, although it promoted radical policies whilst in power, also appealed to a common identity and created a sense of public security. In contrast, the TFG has failed to provide public order and build national unity.

In Frame:
“Somalia is an accountability free zone. No one is held accountable to international laws or human rights; the donors are not accountable to their own principles; the Transitional Federal Government is not accountable to its own charter, no one is accountable to the Somali people. The essential missing element is an accountability framework. There are no benchmarks, and no measures of success.”

Member of the international community
Nairobi, March 2008

In the absence of a centrally administered trained police service and an independent judiciary, legal judgment and actions are taken on an arbitrary basis, engendering a widespread sense of impunity. Corrupt officials and TFG soldiers engaging in widespread looting, arbitrary arrest, kidnapping and killing have undermined public trust toward President Abdullahi Yusuf and his administration. The vast majority of the Somali population now considers that decisions taken by TFG officials lack the necessary transparency, credibility and accountability.

Furthermore, in view of the fact increased international donors’ pledges result in only a fraction of these actually being disbursed and reaching the poor and vulnerable Somali groups, the population has lost faith to the international community and their TFG partner. Fund mismanagement and corruption are creating divisions and are further alienating Somalia from the TFG. Somali civil society is gradually finding a voice, calling for a broadly representative and reliable government that would provide for and protect its people. Crucially, with poor governance and violations of human rights being played to the interests of radical elements, public confidence in the TFG is crumbling.

In Frame:
“Warlords: this gives an important title to complete and utter criminals. Anyone with 250 men was a warlord and then the United States thought they had to give them a place at the table. These people have no good intentions. So we now have a government full of very bad actors.”

Human rights worker
Hargeisa, March 2008

2.3 Dynamics of the Humanitarian situation in Somalia
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/chronic_failures_war_terror/somalia/humanitarian

The current humanitarian situation in Somalia is catastrophic, but there is little evidence to suggest that the international community is paying much attention. An unprecedented food emergency and the constant fighting between myriad warring factions have elevated a crisis that has been a constant presence in the Horn of Africa for decades, threatening the stability of the whole region. Unlike Darfur, where billions of dollars of aid are being invested and thousands of aid workers operate, Somalia remains a place to avoid. The United Nations estimates that the country received about USD 200 million in aid in 2007, and the number of aid workers in the country continues to decrease.

In Frame:
“The International Community says they are concerned with the Somali conflict but we don’t see them doing anything competent to resolve it.”

Identity withheld
Mogadishu, March 2008

Starvation: failing harvests, droughts and insecurity driving up food prices

A lethal combination of factors, including record food prices, droughts, consecutive poor harvests, hyper-inflation, plagues and pervasive insecurity mean that Somalis are currently facing the lowest level of food security in years. Record levels of famine are expected, as the malnutrition rates throughout the country raise above the emergency threshold.

The harvest in Somalia’s traditional crop regions appears to have failed. In early March 2008 the Food Security Analysis Unit for Somalia reported that over two million Somalis are now in need of humanitarian assistance, but the World Food Programme will only be able to provide food aid to a quarter of those in need this year.

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, people in central Somalia are facing life threatening shortages of food and water, with some families relying on a single meal each day.

Further complicating matters, sharp rises in the cost of fuel have increased the costs of transporting water supplies and food, further impacting on prices. Rising fuel costs have also altered the trading dynamics of Mogadishu’s Bakara market.

The harvest in Somalia’s traditional crop regions appears to have failed. In early March 2008 the Food Security Analysis Unit for Somalia reported that over two million Somalis are now in need of humanitarian assistance, but the World Food Programme will only be able to provide food aid to a quarter of those in need this year.

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, people in central Somalia are facing life threatening shortages of food and water, with some families relying on a single meal each day.

Further complicating matters, sharp rises in the cost of fuel have increased the costs of transporting water supplies and food, further impacting on prices. Rising fuel costs have also altered the trading dynamics of Mogadishu’s Bakara market.

In late March 2008 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees warned that since the start of the year more than 70,000 people have fled Mogadishu and that at least 15,000 have sought refuge in neighbouring Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Sudan.

Humanitarian agencies report that a quarter of Somalia’s one million Internally Displaced People are now concentrated along the fifteen kilometre stretch of road between Mogadishu to Afgoye, in what constitutes, according to UN, "probably the single largest IDP gathering in the world today."

Limited international aid contributions to Somalia

Since 2000, Somalia has received an average of USD 200 million per year in aid from international donors, almost half in the form of food shipments. Health, agriculture, water and sanitation, shelter and economic recovery are the lowest in spending priority.

In Frame:
International Aid Contributions to Somalia 2007 (figures)

3. Comparison of Somalia Conflict Dynamics to Afghanistan
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/chronic_failures_war_terror/somalia/comparison

The conflict theatres of Somalia and Afghanistan share a number of similarities, not least regarding the tactics, techniques and motivations utilised by their respective insurgencies. There are a number of factors that propel each militant Islamist group. For instance, the sophisticated use of propaganda in both countries has assisted in the intimidation and radicalisation of local populations. The presence of foreign forces also underpins this, with militant Islamists able to depict incoming forces as aggressive Christian armies intent upon repressing the indigenous Muslim populations. Notably, in both Afghanistan and Somalia, the current governmental authorities enjoy greater legitimacy with the international community than within their own borders.

3.1 The rise of political Islamism in Somalia and Afghanistan

There are strong historical parallels in the rise of political Islamism in Somalia and Afghanistan, and although key differences remain in substance, since 9/11, the international community has harboured fears about the ‘Talibanisation’ of Somalia. These fears were seemingly fulfilled when the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) came to power in 2004.

Both countries endured sustained periods of civil war after the collapse of weak, illegitimate and divisive states. Repression under the two ostensibly Socialist regimes politicised Islamist groups, and Islamism emerged as a powerful ideology, with the distinct capacity to mobilise across clan, tribal, ethnic and class lines. The internal legitimacy of the Taliban and ICU regimes was grounded in the ability to provide widespread, relatively inclusive security. As war and hardship took their toll, physical security became of paramount importance for vulnerable populations and the business communities in need of secure markets and trade routes.

In Frame:
“Local people supported the Islamic Courts because they wanted security. The safe movement of goods, security and movement of people is what people want, and if the Islamic Courts can deliver these basics, then they will be acceptable. Security is what people care about.”

Identity withheld
Mogadishu, March 2008

By 2000, the Taliban brought Afghanistan’s warlords under control, and controlled 95% of the country. In 2006 the ICU eradicated the roadblocks manned by warring militias and brought security to Mogadishu for the first time in seventeen years, and also secured much of south-central Somalia. Both the Taliban and the ICU abstained from factionalism and controlled disciplined forces that did not rape or loot. The ICU and the Taliban both declared that terrorists caught on national soil would be tried by national courts and not handed over to the international community. However, both regimes proved short-lived: the Taliban fell after the US invasion in 2001 and the ICU fell just six months after establishing its authority, following invasion by US-backed Ethiopian troops in December 2006.

By 2000, the Taliban brought Afghanistan’s warlords under control, and controlled 95% of the country. In 2006 the ICU eradicated the roadblocks manned by warring militias and brought security to Mogadishu for the first time in seventeen years, and also secured much of south-central Somalia. Both the Taliban and the ICU abstained from factionalism and controlled disciplined forces that did not rape or loot. The ICU and the Taliban both declared that terrorists caught on national soil would be tried by national courts and not handed over to the international community. However, both regimes proved short-lived: the Taliban fell after the US invasion in 2001 and the ICU fell just six months after establishing its authority, following invasion by US-backed Ethiopian troops in December 2006.

As war continues between international forces against both the Taliban and the ICU, the differences between the regimes are also telling.

Where the ICU in 2004-6 represented an uneasy coalition of Islamist institutions, from moderate to extreme, Taliban politics are based on conservative Islam.

However, while this led to tolerance of Al-Qaeda training bases in Afghanistan, the only evidence of Al-Qaeda in Somalia has been one small cell. Although some extremist groups operate in Somalia, such as Al-Shabab, local security issues remain important and calls for international jihad have not gained significant support as yet.

In Frame:
“Somalia shares features with the Afghanistan insurgency, and there is a strong sense of frustration with the lack of response from the International Community policy community.”

Identity withheld
Nairobi, March 2008

3.2 Tactics and drivers

As the complexities of the conflict are unravelled, it becomes apparent that there are three tiers of actors that interact for a variety of tactical and strategic reasons:

In Frame:
Commonalities between the Somali and Afghan Conflicts 9Comparative Diagram)

In Frame:
If you don’t remove the reason why Al-Shabab exists, it will just be replaced by another group tomorrow.”

Elder
Hargeisa, March 2008

In Frame:
“The recent beheadings are used to exert psychological control over the population. Insurgency cannot take and hold territory, but and neither can the government or the Ethiopians. The Al-Shabab is using hit and run tactic to broaden their areas of control.”

Elder
Identity withheld
Nairobi, March 2008

Tactical shifts in Somali insurgency

Somalia has long been considered a safe haven for terrorists, but there is little evidence to suggest that it has served this purpose on any appreciable scale. While the presence of high profile terrorists in Somalia over the years is beyond dispute, the phenomenon of beheadings and suicide attacks - traditionally associated with the Al-Qaeda/radical Islamist culture - have not been a common feature of conflict in the country.

Security reports from Somalia show that beheadings are an extremely rare event, with only a handful of cases recorded in the past three years. The earliest reports about beheadings come from the brief period of domination of the Islamic Courts Union, when its leaders allegedly put the practice into use against some warlords or threatened to use it as a religious punishment. Although still a rare tactic, on 13 March Al-Shabab fighters killed and beheaded three soldiers. Regarding the other high profile Al-Qaeda inspired tactic, suicide attacks, there are four recorded cases of such attacks in Somalia. These are invariably used as an asymmetric tool of resistance against occupying forces.

In Frame:
Timeline of Suicide Attacks in Somalia (list)

In Frame:
“The extreme version of Islam is a reaction to the US policies and actions.”

Identity withheld
Nairobi, March 2008

In Frame:
“Al-Qaeda and others" extreme ideologies should have met substantial resistance in Somalia as Somalis are moderate Muslims and have historically separated their religion from political or governance matters. But now the US has created this sense of being under siege and we have unified against that threat: this is creating a great political opportunity for Al-Qaeda.”

Teacher
Nairobi, March 2008

Note
Somalia is the southern confines of the Strategic Ellipse.
A quite telling geo-strategic and geopolitical design from: http://www.juancole.com/2006_09_01_juancole_archive.html

Article Source: http://www.afroarticles.com/article-dashboard

About The Author: Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis - is Orientalist, Assyriologist, Egyptologist, Iranologist, Islamologist, Historian and Political Scientist. Dr. Megalommatis, 51, is the author of 12 books, dozens of scholarly articles, hundreds of encyclopedia entries, and thousands of articles. He speaks, reads and writes more than 15, modern and ancient, languages.

| View Profile & All Articles By: Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis |

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