Kenya's Forgotten Somali Refugees – The Racist Kikuyu Regime of Kenya Outspokenly Denounced by HRW

By: Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis

[ Posted On: 2009-04-22 ]

In two previous articles entitled "The Unsaid Evildoings of the Racist Kikuyu Regime – HRW Report on Kenya´s Forgotten Somali Refugees" (http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/98689) and “Devastating HRW Report on Kenya's Forgotten Somali Refugees Reveals Evilness of Kikuyu Racist Regime” (http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/98701), I republished the introductory parts, Summary and Recommendations, of a Report released a few days ago by the leading humanitarian NGO HRW on Kenya's Forgotten Somali Refugees. In the present article, I continue the republication of further parts of the Report, notably the Methodology and Border Closure, Refoulement, and Police Abuses in Border Areas. Before the two parts, I add the Table of Contents.

From Horror to Hopelessness - Kenya's Forgotten Somali Refugee Crisis
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/03/29/horror-hopelessness

From Horror to Hopelessness - Kenya's Forgotten Somali Refugee Crisis

I. Summary

II. Recommendations

To the Government of Kenya

To UNHCR

To the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Special Rapporteur on

Refugees, Asylum Seekers, IDPs and Migrants in Africa

To other governments providing funding for Somali refugees and asylum seekers

III. Methodology

IV. Border Closure, Refoulement, and Police Abuses in Border Areas

The border closure and closure of UNHCR-run refugee transit center in Liboi

Refoulement (unlawful forced refugee return)

Kenyan police bribes, detention, and violence in the border areas, in Dadaab's camps, and on smuggling routes

V. Humanitarian Crisis in Dadaab's Camps

Overcrowding

Registration Crisis

Humanitarian assistance crisis

Funding for Dadaab's Camps

VI. Kenya's de facto Encampment Policy for Refugees

Number of Somali refugees in Nairobi

Restriction of humanitarian assistance

Permission to travel from Dadaab to Nairobi

Lengthy UNHCR refugee status determination procedures and unclear Department of

Refugee Affairs registration practices in Nairobi

VII. Acknowledgments

Annex I: Provincial Map of Kenya

Annex II: UNHCR Overview Map of Dadaab's Camps, December 2008

Annex III: HRW Overview of UNHCR Registration Statistics for Dadaab's Camps

III. Methodology

http://www.hrw.org/en/node/81791/section/4

This report is based on research conducted in Kenya between October 6 and 24, 2008.

Human Rights Watch conducted in-depth interviews with 54 Somali refugees (including 30 adult females and four children, two girls and two boys) in the three refugee camps (Dagahaley, Hagadera, and Ifo) near Dadaab town in Kenya's North Eastern Province.

Human Rights Watch worked with local contacts to identify areas in the Dadaab camps where recently arriving refugees were known to have settled. Interviews with refugees in Dadaab's camps were conducted individually in settings isolated from other refugees (under trees or in refugees' shelters) and lasted an average of 45 minutes. All interviews were conducted in English and Somali using a Somali interpreter of Kenyan nationality.

In Eastleigh, Nairobi, Human Rights Watch conducted 11 interviews with Somali refugees (five male, six female). A Kenyan journalist familiar with Eastleigh and members of a local nongovernmental organization (NGO) working with Somali refugees identified refugees to interview.

In Dadaab town, Human Rights Watch conducted a further 20 interviews with staff from United Nations agencies and national and international NGOs, as well as with representatives of the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) and a Member of the Kenyan Parliament.

In Nairobi, Human Rights Watch conducted a further 14 interviews with staff from United Nations agencies and international NGOs, five interviews with staff from Kenyan NGOs, interviews with staff from five embassies and three donor agencies based in Nairobi, and interviews with the DRA and a Member of the Kenyan Parliament.

Where individuals or agencies requested that some or all of their interviews not be attributed to them, Human Rights Watch has not identified those individuals or their agencies or the precise date on which the interview took place. For their safety, Human Rights Watch has also not published the names of any Somali refugees interviewed in this report.

IV. Border Closure, Refoulement, and Police Abuses in Border Areas
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/81791/section/5

Since Kenya officially closed its border with Somalia in January 2007, at least 80,000 Somali asylum seekers have entered Kenya. This continuous cross-border movement gives the impression that the border closure has not affected Somali asylum seekers' ability to seek refuge in Kenya. In reality, however, the border closure has led to the forcible return of asylum seekers and refugees to Somalia by Kenyan police (in violation of Kenya's fundamental obligations under international and Kenyan refugee law), and to serious Kenyan police abuses of Somali asylum seekers and refugees. By forcing the closure of a UNHCR-run registration center close to the border, Kenyan authorities have seriously aggravated the humanitarian assistance needs among Somalis arriving in three refugee camps near the Kenyan town of Dadaab, which shelter almost 260,000 refugees, making them the world's largest refugee settlement.[1]

The border closure and closure of UNHCR-run refugee transit center in Liboi

Border closure

Following the intervention of Ethiopian troops in support of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) in December 2006, the Kenyan authorities announced the closure of Kenya's border with Somalia on January 3, 2007.[2] Referring to concerns that UIC fighters and possibly Al-Qaeda operatives fighting side by side with them might enter Kenya and endanger Kenya's national security, and echoing statements by the US State Department,[3]Kenya's then Foreign Minister Raphael Tuju said that Kenya was "not able to ascertain whether these people [Somali refugees] are genuine refugees or fighters and therefore it's best that they remain in Somalia."[4] That same day, Kenyan authorities deported 420 mostly women and children to Somalia.[5]National and international agencies condemned the border closure.[6]

Despite the closure, at least 80,000 Somali refugees crossed into Kenya in 2007 and 2008, reflecting the fact that Kenya's 682-kilometer border with Somalia is porous and hard to police.[7] In June 2008, Kenya's immigration minister publicly declared that "the border closure has not achieved what it was intended for."[8]

According to humanitarian workers and Kenyans with a good knowledge of the Kenya-Somali border, in 2007 and 2008 the vast majority of Somali asylum seekers entered Kenya at the HarHar border crossing, located three kilometers from the Somali border town of Doble and 15 kilometers from the Kenyan border town of Liboi.[9] Dadaab's camps are located about 100 kilometers from the border.[10]

Closure of UNHCR-run refugee transit center in Liboi

Before Kenya's border closure, UNHCR registered newly-arrived asylum seekers at their refugee transit center in Liboi. After completing registration and health-screening, [11] UNHCR transported them to the camps where they were directed to their plots of land. [12]

The border closure forced the transit center to close. [13] Although the Kenyan authorities knew they could not prevent Somali refugees from crossing the porous border, they sought to portray an image of sovereign control in the face of perceived Islamist threats to Kenya's security. [14] The existence of a UNHCR center set up to welcome refugees 15 kilometers from an officially closed border sent a contradictory message, in their view. [15]

After the transit center closed, UNHCR continued to register refugees who managed to find their own way to the camps. The Kenyan authorities agreed to this compromise, although they initially set a total limit of 2,000 refugees. When UNHCR continued registering asylum seekers well beyond that limit, the authorities did not intervene. [16] This unspoken compromise sought to avoid embarrassing the government, while simultaneously allowing UNHCR to register and assist new refugees in Dadaab, and continues to this day.

The Liboi transit center closure has had two serious implications for Somali refugees fleeing to Dadaab.

First, the closure means UNHCR can no longer register all new refugees in one place the moment they enter Kenya. Instead, it is obliged to register refugees in Dadaab's three sprawling and separated camps. [17] Even in ideal circumstances-with registration centers and sufficient registration staff in each camp-this process would lead to delays in registration and, therefore, in access to food, water, shelter, and health services. In the less than ideal circumstances in Dadaab's camps-where between June and December 2008 registration of record numbers of refugees took place in only one camp-the fact that UNHCR was forced to register new refugees in the camp led to significant registration delays of many weeks or even months and, even worse, to possibly thousands of refugees failing to get registered at all. The details of this situation are set out below in chapter V.

Second, Human Rights Watch documented serious Kenyan police abuses against Somali refugees between the border and Dadaab's camps, including systematic bribery and reports of violence, including rape. The details are set out below. Re-opening the Liboi transit center-and particularly re-introducing UNHCR transfer of refugees from the border to the center and from the center to the camps-would significantly protect Somali refugees from Kenyan police abuses.

Both Kenya's Department of Refugee Affairs and UNHCR have continuously called on the Kenyan authorities to allow UNHCR to re-open the transit center.[18] On November 19, 2008, the US embassy in Kenya added its voice to these calls, stressing that "Kenya is obligated to allow Somalis to cross the border to seek asylum," and that "a reception center for orderly registration and medical and security screenings is urgently needed to provide protection to the Kenyan host population and for the refugees in the camp." It urged "the Government of Kenya to re-open and authorize expansion of the Liboi Reception Center near the Somali border to meet the needs of new asylum seekers."[19]

Refoulement (unlawful forced refugee return)

Since the border closure, the Kenyan authorities have deported hundreds if not thousands of Somali refugees and asylum seekers back to their war-torn country, thereby violating the most fundamental part of refugee law, the right not to be refouled – forcibly returned to a place where a person faces a threat to life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.[20] In accordance with its obligations as party to the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problems in Africa, Kenya is further obliged not to send refugees back to situations of generalized violence such as in Somalia.[21]

Prohibition of refoulement

Under its Immigration law, Kenya has the right to regulate who is present on its territory and may prevent certain categories of people from entering or remaining in Kenya, including those deemed to be a threat to its national interests. [22] Since the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, there has been increased concern within Kenya over potential incursions of terrorist suspects from Somalia. These concerns were heightened when the Union of Islamic Courts took power in Mogadishu in June 2008. Following the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in December 2006 and a Somali militia incursion into El Wak in November 2008, [23] Kenyan security forces have been deployed along the Somali-Kenyan border in increased numbers. [24]

Despite these legitimate security concerns, Kenyan law-consistent with its international legal obligations-obliges Kenya to allow asylum seekers access to Kenyan territory to seek asylum and prohibits their refoulement. [25]

Applying the definition of a refugee in the OAU Refugee Convention, Kenyan law also provides that any non-Kenyan in Kenya has the right not to be returned to a place where "the person's life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened on account of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing pubic order…," [26] and that such persons shall automatically be deemed to be a refugee ("primafacie refugee"). [27] Somalis registering in Dadaab with UNHCR and-to an unknown extent-Somalis registering with the Department of Refugee Affairs in Nairobi are automatically granted status in Kenya based on this prima facie recognition. [28]

An asylum seeker claiming refugee status in Kenya has a right to have his or her case considered. Kenya may only deny a person refugee status who otherwise qualifies under the criteria in the OAU Refugee Convention if the person falls within one or more categories excluded from refugee status by Kenyan law, and then only after it has conducted an individual review of that person's background. [29] In addition, like all asylum seekers in Kenya, Somali asylum seekers are entitled under Kenyan law to seek asylum wherever the Department of Refugee Affairs or UNHCR has offices in Kenya. [30] They are, therefore, legally entitled to do so in Dadaab or in Nairobi and, regardless of whether they have entered Kenya through an official border crossing point or not, are theoretically free to travel from the Somali border to either of those two places without being arrested or detained. [31] However, as set out below, Kenya actually continues to violate these fundamental rights.

Reports of refoulement and attempted refoulement in 2008 and 2009

Throughout 2008 and in early 2009, the Kenyan authorities refouled, or attempted to refoule, hundreds of Somali refugees and asylum seekers. As Kenyan organizations and lawyers working with Somali refugees and asylum seekers know that they are only rarely made aware of case of imminent deportations, Human Rights Watch believes that these known cases are only the tip of the iceberg and that possibly thousands of Somalis suffered a similar fate. Refoulement often took place in remote border areas, where asylum seekers have no way of contacting lawyers, Kenyan NGOs, or UNHCR. Kenyan NGOs and lawyers told Human Rights Watch that cases of which they became aware in 2008 are a small percentage of the true number of Somalis being arrested, detained, fined, and then refouled to Somalia.[32]

Refoulement

On May 9, 2008, Kenyan police intercepted 10 asylum seekers (all women and children) at UNHCR's then-closed refugee transit center and took them to the border. [33]

In mid-May 2008, a group of about 20 Somali asylum seekers arriving at the camps for the first time were arrested by Kenyan police at 2 am as they entered Ifo camp and were detained for three days in the camps' police station before being unlawfully returned to Somalia. [34]

Human Rights Watch spoke to two Somali girls who in two separate almost identical incidents in July 2008 were unlawfully deported to Somalia (though they later returned to Kenya), together with 70 other Somali refugees and asylum seekers, after having been detained and beaten in Garissa and Mwingi police stations [35] for 10 days:

We were driven in the back of trucks from Garissa police station straight to the border. Whenever anyone tried to stand up, the police beat them with sticks. When we arrived at the border, the police told us to walk across the border to Doble and not to come back. [36]

On September 9, 2008, Kenyan police intercepted a minibus near Dagahaley camp carrying 19 asylum seekers and five refugees, all of whom were transported to Wajir, northeast of Dadaab, before being returned to Somalia. [37]

In the early evening of October 10, 2008, a witness in Liboi saw Kenyan police round up close to 100 Somalis, put them in a civilian bus, and drive them toward the border. Later the same day the same witness spoke to colleagues in Liboi who interviewed the Somalis on arrival in Doble, on the Somalia side of the border. [38]

Human Rights Watch also heard credible evidence from two people living and working in and around Liboi that Kenya's Rapid Deployment Unit, active in the border areas in 2008, has regularly turned back buses at the border crossing point of HarHar or-after they redeployed in around mid-2008-from areas about half way along the 15-kilometer stretch of road between HarHar and Liboi. [39]

Because of this unlawful practice, that risks forcing asylum seekers back across the border, mini-buses from Doble drop asylum seekers in the bush just across the border at HarHar and tell them to walk to Liboi or to other pick-up points in the bush between HarHar and Liboi. [40] Kenyan security forces are likely to spot the Somalis walking through the bush toward Liboi and-based on Human Rights Watch testimony in this report -are likely to subject them to arrest, detention, abuse, and refoulement.

In early 2009, Kenya continued to refoule refugees and asylum seekers, some under appalling circumstances.

On January 16, Kenyan police opened fire on a vehicle driving in the border areas near Liboi, injuring three Somali nationals who were among 29 people who had just crossed the border. They were taken to the health center in Dadaab town where they were confirmed to be asylum seekers from Somalia's capital Mogadishu. According to hospital staff, six Kenyan police officers entered the health center on January 21, ordered the three wounded asylum seekers into a van, and drove towards the border. The same day the Kenyan authorities confirmed that the three had been returned to Somalia.[41]

On January 25, Kenyan police arrested almost 100 Somali nationals, including 59 children under the age of 12, in the town of Wajir, approximately 100 kilometers from the border and 230 kilometers from Dadaab's camps, charged them with "illegal presence," fined them, and deported them to Somalia.[42]

Attempted refoulement

In 2008, the Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK) successfully organized legal representation, which helped prevent the refoulement of 150 Somali refugees and asylum seekers. [43]

On May 23, Somali asylum seekers were arrested on the island of Lamu. Thanks to an immigration officer trained by RCK in refugee law, no deportation orders were issued and they were handed over to UNHCR.

Between April and August, the RCK represented 47 Somali asylum seekers who had arrived in Kenya by boat and who were arrested in the coastal towns of Mombasa and Malindi and were threatened with deportation. The court quashed the deportation orders and instructed the Kenyan authorities to take the refugees to Dadaab's camps.

Between April and September, the RCK secured the release of 38 asylum seekers (including 13 Somalis) arrested in Nairobi on charges of unlawful presence in Kenya.

On December 3, 28 Somali asylum seekers traveling to Nairobi were arrested in the coastal town of Taveta. The RCK secured their release and ensured they were handed over to the Department of Refugee Affairs and UNHCR for registration.

Also in December, Kenyan police arrested 55 Somalis as they approached Dadaab's camps. The RCK intervened just before they were deported and a court ordered the police to release them and take them to Dadaab's camps.

Kenyan police bribes, detention, and violence in the border areas, in Dadaab's camps, and on smuggling routes

The border closure has led to widespread Kenyan police malpractice and related abuses against Somali refugees in the border areas. Human Rights Watch spoke to many refugees in Dadaab and with Nairobi-based NGOs working with refugees who confirm that Somali (and other) refugees have been victims of Kenyan police demands for bribes and other abuses for many years.

Police officers demand bribes in exchange for allowing onward movement to Dadaab or Nairobi. If they refuse or cannot pay the bribe, refugees are detained in appalling conditions in overcrowded cells with no space to sleep and at times with no access to latrines. Some are beaten and Human Rights Watch spoke to a young girl who was raped in a police station in one of the refugee camps. Those who finally are unable to pay are deported back to Somalia.[44]

Kenyan police corruption in the border areas and throughout Kenya is not new. Kenya's police force is known to be the most corrupt of Kenya's public institutions, leading Transparency International's 2008 Kenyan bribery index for the fourth year in a row.[45]

However, the border closure and the related Liboi transit center closure have made a bad situation worse. The absence of UNHCR protection and transportation between the border and Dadaab's camps means that Kenya's police now have free reign to intercept and demand bribes of Somali refugees attempting to reach Dadaab's camps, threatening deportation and inflicting violence if refugees refuse.

Under the Kenyan Constitution, which reflects key provisions of international human rights treaties to which Kenya is party, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,[46] all people in Kenya, including refugees and asylum seekers, are entitled to protection of their property,[47] freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention,[48] and freedom from all forms of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.[49] The border closure has, therefore, unquestionably led to an increase in serious human rights abuses against Somali refugees and asylum seekers, a point which UNHCR raised with Kenyan government officials at the highest level in January 2009.[50]

Demands for bribes between the border and Dadaab's camps

The border closure has seen the growth of a lucrative people-smuggling network between Doble and Dadaab, with Somali asylum seekers paying smugglers fees to ensure they can safely cross from Somalia to Dadaab's camps.[51] Kenyan police corruption in the border areas is so endemic that smugglers reportedly include the cost of Kenyan police bribes in their fees, although this does not guarantee safe passage once in Kenya.[52] Even before leaving home in Somalia, asylum seekers know that they should take as much money as possible with them to pay for additional bribes.[53]

Human Rights Watch spoke to many Somali asylum seekers and refugees who described how the Kenyan police stopped their vehicles between the border and Dadaab's camps and asked the driver for money.[54] The following are just some examples.

On October 10, 2008, two Somali female refugees in their mid-thirties with their 15 children crossed the border from Doble and reached Liboi. The next morning they boarded a minibus and drove on the road towards Dadaab. The Kenyan police stopped them at a check point, told all the men to get out of the bus and run away (which they did), and told the women and children to stay on the bus. They then told the driver that everyone on the bus would be returned to Somalia, unless the driver collected US$100 per family. The refugees managed to pay enough to secure their onward journey to Dadaab's camps. [55]

In mid-September 2008, a 40-year-old widow with eight children paid people smugglers $100 to travel the 100 kilometers from Doble to Dadaab through the bush where the vehicle with 30 Somali asylum seekers was intercepted by Kenyan police. The police demanded the driver pay to be allowed to continue, which he did.[56]A 32-year-old woman with seven children recounted almost the exact same story about her journey that took place in mid-August 2008.[57]

According to UNHCR, it "frequently conducts … border monitoring missions to Liboi," although it says it would like to increase its capacity to ensure wider and more systematic monitoring of the border areas. [58]

Bribes, detention and related police violence near and in Dadaab's camps
Even when refugees manage to reach Dadaab's camps, they still face the risk of Kenyan police bribes, arrest, detention, and violence, including in Kenyan police stations inside the camps.[59]

Human Rights Watch spoke with a 17-year-old girl who was intercepted, together with 20 other Somali asylum seekers, by Kenyan police in February 2008 as they reached Hagadera camp. She and the other asylum seekers were held at the Gadudey police post[60] for 10 days when refugees from the same clan in Hagadera camp paid a $300 bribe to secure their release. In the evening of the eighth day of her detention, the police raped her:

I left the cell to go to the toilet but two policemen stopped me and told me to go into a room and lie down. One of the men held down my arms and the other raped me. I was so scared that I couldn't even shout but then the second man wanted to rape me and I started to scream. The first one tried to choke me but I struggled and they let me go. They left the room, locked the door and left me alone for one hour. Then they took me back to the cell. The others asked me where I had been but I could not tell them. I was too ashamed. This is the first time I have talked about it.[61]

A 16-year-old girl explained how she was dropped off by a minibus close to Ifo camp in early September 2008, where a pre-arranged "guide" met her and other refugees to bring them to the camp. Less than a kilometer from the camp the group was intercepted by the Kenyan police and she was taken to the police station inside Ifo camp:

The police held me for three days and nights in a police cell. There were 30 other refugees in the cell. They had all recently arrived in the camp. The police asked us for money so that we could be released. When we said we had no money they beat us. They beat me on my arms, legs and back with a wooden stick and with a rubber whip made out of a car's tire. They beat me three times for about five minutes each time. After the third beating I was in so much pain that I gave them $50 I had hidden under my headscarf. Then they let me go.[62]

Police near Dadaab town also demand bribes and threaten deportation. A 34-year-old man told Human Rights Watch that he arrived from Somalia in Dadaab town on August 25, 2008, and then started walking towards Ifo camp. Close to Dadaab's airport, the police stopped him and, on hearing he had just arrived from Somalia, demanded he pay 4,000 Kenyan Shilling (K Sh), about US$50, or face deportation to Somalia.[63]

These abuses are all the more concerning because UNHCR has increased its "visits" to police bases in the camps since August 2008 to at least three a week. It now regularly organizes security meetings between refugees, the police operating in the camps, and NGOs to discuss "operational concerns."[64]

UNHCR says that most police cases drawn to its attention in Dadaab involve arrest and detention of refugees charged with "illegally being outside a designated area." Under the 2006 Refugees Act, a person who "resides without authority outside the designated areas specified under" the Act "commits an offence," and is liable to a fine of up to K Sh20,000 ($2,500), imprisonment of up to six months, or both.[65] However, to date the Minister of State for Immigration and Registration of Persons has not designated Dadaab's three camps as refugee camps,[66] which means that refugees moving in and out of Dadaab's camps cannot lawfully be charged with (or detained in relation to) "residing outside a designated area." In addition, even if the camps were to be officially designated as refugee camps, international refugee and human rights law and Kenyan Constitutional law prohibits the Kenyan authorities from limiting refugees' right to free movement outside the camps, unless special circumstances apply. This is looked at in chapter VI.

Bribes, detention, and related police violence between Dadaab and Nairobi.

Human Rights Watch spoke with people living and working in Dadaab and Garissa who know bus drivers working between the camps, Garissa town (100 kilometers south west of Dadaab), and Nairobi. They confirmed that a bus ticket for Somalis includes the cost of bribing Kenyan police along the Dadaab-Garissa-Nairobi road.[67] One refugee told Human Rights Watch that corrupt police permanently man the Tana Bridge on the edge of Garissa, on the only land route to Nairobi, and that Somali refugees refer to the bridge as "halak," meaning cobra.[68]

A 23-year-old Somali refugee traveling from Garissa to Naiorbi with her seven-month-old baby told Human Rights Watch that when she reached the Tana Bridge the police boarded the bus and took all passengers without identity documents to the police post next to the bridge and demanded K Sh4,000 ($50) from each of them to allow them to continue their journey.[69]

Human Rights Watch spoke with one refugee who had paid $100 to travel from Garissa to Nairobi, including the cost of police bribes:

Whenever the police stopped the car, they looked at me on the back seat and then asked the driver "do you have any mbuzi ?" ("goods"), which was a reference to me as a possible foreigner without identity papers. Each time the driver said, "Yes, I have one mbuzi," and paid them money.[70]

Human Rights Watch spoke with two girls, aged 15 and 17, who had escaped sexual violence in Mogadishu. During their attempt to reach Nairobi from Dadaab, unknown people-almost certainly cooperating with the smugglers-beat and robbed them and Kenyan police demanded bribes and subjected them to appalling treatment, including violence, in Garissa and Mwingi police stations, before deporting them to Somalia. One of the girls' full story is set out in full above.[71]

Notes

[1] The three camps surrounding Dadaab town are Dagahaley (population 77,036), Hagadera (91,982), and Ifo (86,732)–a total of 255,750 (February 28, 2009). UNHCR statistics on file with Human Rights Watch. The camps are located within an 18 kilometer radius of Dadaab town, cover 50 square kilometers, and are separated from each other by significant distances. See the overview map of the camps in Annex II.

[2] "Kenyans close border with Somalia," BBC News, January 3, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6227083.stm (accessed January 14, 2009). Kenya has designated only two places on its border with Somalia–Liboi and Mandera–as official border crossings. Department of Immigration, Kenya, http://www.immigration.go.ke/index.php?id=27 (accessed February 24, 2009).

[3] Noor Ali, "Kenya on alert as Somalia fighting nears border," Reuters, January 3, 2007, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L0383709.htm (accessed February 25, 2009), quoting US State Department spokesman Sean McCormack: "We would be concerned that no leaders who were members of the Islamic Courts which have ties to terrorist organizations including al Qaeda are allowed to flee and leave Somalia."

[4] "Kenyans close border with Somalia," BBC News.

[5] Amnesty International, "Denied refuge: The effect of the closure of the Kenya/Somali border on thousands of Somali asylum-seekers and refugees," May 2, 2007, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR32/002/2007 (accessed January 14, 2009), pp. 3-4.

[6] Refugee Consortium Kenya (RCK), "Returning Somali Refugees: Kenya is Violating International Law," January 10, 2007, http://72.3.131.88/uploadedFiles/Investigate/070103per cent20RCKper cent20Pressper cent20Release.pdf (accessed January 13, 2008). Amnesty International, "Denied Refuge." Refugees International, "Kenya denying asylum to Somali refugees," January 4, 2007, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/node/1545 (accessed January 14, 2009).

[7] In 2007 and 2008, UNHCR registered 18,932 and 61,761 new refugees respectively in Dadaab's camps, of whom 95 percent were Somalis. See Annex III. In 2008, UNHCR registered 654 Somali asylum seekers in Nairobi. UNHCR statistics, on file with Human Rights Watch. As noted below in chapter VI it is possible that in 2008 alone, tens of thousands of Somalis made their way directly from the border to Nairobi. However, because Somalis are not registered when crossing the border and because Kenya's Department of Refugee Affairs does not publish statistics relating to its registration of non-Kenyan nationals in Nairobi, there is no way of knowing how many Somalis traveled directly to Nairobi or other parts of Kenya such as Mombassa.

[8] Guled Mohamed, "Somali refugees pour into Kayna," Reuters, June 18, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKL187685620080618 (accessed January 18, 2009).

[9] See map in Annex I. Human Rights Watch interviews with NGO workers, UN agency staff and independent journalists in Nairobi, Dadaab, and Liboi, October 2008. Refugees crossing the border on the Doble-Liboi road take three different routes from Mogadishu to reach Liboi. The route chosen depends on the state of the (often flooded) coastal roads, the number of checkpoints on any given road, and the person's clan affiliation, which can make some roads more dangerous than others. Refugees from Kismayo also enter Kenya on the Doble-Liboi road. Some Somalis in 2007 and 2008 entered Kenya further north close to the Kenyan town of Khorot Harar and between or through the northern towns of El Wak and Mandera. Many originate from areas just across the border in Somalia and are a mixture of refugees and people fleeing drought. Most do not venture further south (to Dadaab and Nairobi) because they want to regularly check on their property in Somalia and increasingly because new clan alliances arising out of the recent conflict mean they would feel at risk of attack traveling between these northern towns and Dadaab's camps further south. Those entering through Mandera include Somalis coming directly from Mogadishu who can afford the expensive direct Mogadishu-Mandera trip. Somali refugees also enter Kenya through the border crossing of Amoma south of Liboi. Human Rights Watch interviews with various people living and working in the border areas, Nairobi, Dadaab and Liboi, October 6 – 24, 2008

[10] See Annex I.

[11] Health screening was carried out in Liboi to identify refugees needing vaccinations once in the camps. Human Rights Watch interview with "Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit" (GTZ), Dadaab, October 17, 2008.

[12] Human Rights Watch interview with UNHCR, Dadaab, October 13, 2008, and Lutheran World Foundation (LWF), Dadaab, October 14, 2008. GTZ confirmed that the transit center's closure has made it more difficult to detect health (including vaccination) needs among new refugees, because once they arrive in the camps, refugees disappear and rarely proactively seek medical advice. Human Rights Watch interview with GTZ, Dadaab, October 17, 2008.

[13] After UNHCR reached an agreement with the then Acting Provincial Commissioner for North Eastern Province and with the Department of Refugee Affairs, the center briefly re-opened on March 12, 2008, but closed again on May 6, 2008. Human Rights Watch email exchange with UNHCR, Geneva, February 20, 2009. The center closed after a new Provincial Commissioner was appointed. Confidential Human Rights Watch interview, Nairobi, October 2008.

[14] Human Rights Watch interview with Kenyan official, October 2008.

[15] Human Rights Watch interview with UNHCR, Nairobi, October 7, 2008.

[16] Human Rights Watch interview with UNHCR, Nairobi, October 7, 2008.

[17] Dadaab's three camps are located far from one another. See map in Annex II.

[18] Human Rights Watch interview with Department of Refugee Affairs, Nairobi, October 6, 2008, and with UNHCR, Nairobi, 24 October, 2008.

[19] "U.S. Ambassador Ranneberger Visits Dadaab Refugee Camp," US Department of State, Virtual Presence Post, http://somalia.usvpp.gov/pr_11192008_1.html (accessed January 12, 2009).

[20] "No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." Article 33.1, 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention), 189 U.N.T.S. 150, entered into force April 22, 1954, and its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, entered into force October 4, 1967, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_c_ref.htm, acceded to by Kenya on May 16, 1996 (accessed January 25, 2009).

[21] "No person shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened" for reasons that include "external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order." Article 2(3), 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Refugee Convention), 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, entered into force June 20, 1974, http://www.africa-union.org/Official_documents/Treaties, ratified by Kenya on June 23, 1992 (accessed March 13, 2008).

[22] Section 4, Kenyan Immigration Act, 1967, Law 25 of 1967, as amended by Law No. 6 of 1972, http://www.immigration.go.ke/act.htm (accessed January 17, 2009).

[23] "Kenya-Somalia: Thousands flee amid fears of fighting along border," IRIN, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/PANA-7LSLDF?OpenDocument&rc=1&cc=ken (accessed February 24, 2009).

[24] Cyrus Ombati, "More soldiers deployed along Somalia border," The Standard,http://www.eastandard.net/InsidePage.php?id=1143999573&cid=4 (accessed February 24, 2009).

[25] "No person shall be refused entry into Kenya … if, as a result of such refusal … such person is compelled to return or remain in a country where … the person's life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened on account of … events seriously disturbing public order." Section 18(b), Refugees Act, 2006, Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 97 (Acts No. 13) (2006 Refugees Act), www.refugeelawreader.org/1036/The_Refugees_Act_2006.pdf (accessed January 31, 2009).

[26] Section 18(b), Refugees Act, 2006, Act No.13 of 2006, http://www.kenyalaw.org/kenyalaw/klr_app/frames.php (accessed January 13, 2009), applying the OAU Convention definition of a refugee: "no person shall be refused entry into Kenya … or returned to any … country … if as a result … such person is compelled to return to … a country where (b) the person's life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened on account of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing pubic order….".

[27] Section 3(2), 2006 Refugees Act.

[28] Unless the refugee can be excluded on the basis of exclusion criteria in section 4 of Kenya's Refugee Act, 2006. See chapter VI for UNHCR and DRA procedures for screening refugees in Nairobi. Before the 2008 influx, UNHCR carried out individualised refugee status screening under the 1969 OAU Convention but was unable to maintain this screening given the rate of new arrivals. However, since the influx, it has carried out simple registration based on nationality (cross-referencing biometric data against Kenya's national database to avoid registration of Kenyan nationals seeking assistance in the camps). Human Rights Watch email exchange with UNHCR, February 2009.

[29] Section 11(5), 2006 Refugees Act.

[30] Section 11(1), 2006 Refugees Act.

[31] Section 11(1), 2006 Refugees Act.

[32] Human Rights Watch email exchange with RCK, January 13, 2009. Human Rights Watch interview with legal aid NGO, Nairobi, October 22, 2008.

[33] Human Rights Watch email exchange with UNHCR, Geneva, February 20, 2009.

[34] Human Rights Watch interview, Dadaab, June 29, 2008.

[35] Their experiences in these police stations are referred to below.

[36] Human Rights Watch interview in Eastleigh, Nairobi, October 23, 2008.

[37] Human Rights Watch email exchange with UNHCR, Geneva, February 20, 2009.

[38] Human Rights Watch interview, Nairobi, October 19, 2008.

[39] Confidential Human Rights Watch interview, October 15, 2008.

[40] Human Rights Watch interview with numerous refugees in Dadaab's camps, October 12 – 18, 2008.

[41] UNHCR, "UNHCR calls on Kenya to stop forcible return of Somali asylum seekers," January 27, 2009, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/JBRN7NPGP5?OpenDocument&rc=1&cc=ken (accessed January 27, 2009).

[42] Human Rights Watch email exchange with UNHCR, February 20, 2009. "100 Somalis accused of crossing border illegally," Daily Nation, January 27, 2009. On file with Human Rights Watch.

[43] Human Rights Watch email exchange with RCK, January 13, 2009. See also, "Closure of the Somali Border and its Implications on Refugee Protection," Refugee Consortium Kenya, http://www.rckkenya.org/news12.html (accessed January 13, 2009).

[44] See below, Human Rights Watch interviews with Somali refugees in Dadaab's camps, October 12 – 18, 2008, and in Nairobi with NGOs, October 21 and 22, 2008.

[45] Transparency International, "The Kenya Bribery Index 2008,"http://www.tikenya.org/documents/KenyaBriberyIndex08.pdf (accessed January 18, 2009), p. 16.

[46] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm (accessed March 19, 2008), acceded to by Kenya on May 1, 1972.

[47] Section 75, Constitution of Kenya.

[48] Section 72, Constitution of Kenya.

[49] Section 74, Constitution of Kenya.

[50] Human Rights Watch email exchange with UNHCR Geneva, February 5, 2009.

[51] "People smugglers" should be distinguished from "human traffickers." A person smuggler facilitates transportation, including cross-border movement, for a fee that is voluntarily paid by the person being smuggled: "smuggling of migrants" is defined as "the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident." Article 3(a), Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf (accessed February 24, 2009).A human trafficker is a person engaging in unlawful activity involving "the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation." Article 3(a), Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf (accessed February 24, 2009).

[52] Human Rights Watch interviews with numerous refugees, Dadaab's camps, October 12 – 18 2008.

[53] Human Rights Watch interviews with numerous refugees, Dadaab's camps, October 12 – 18 2008.

[54] Human Rights Watch interviews, Dagahaley camp, October 12 – 18, 2008.

[55] Human Rights Watch interview, Ifo camp, October 13, 2008.

[56] Human Rights Watch interview, Dagahaley camp, October 12, 2008.

[57] Human Rights Watch interview, Dagahaley camp, October 12, 2008.

[58] Human Rights Watch email exchange with UNHCR, Geneva, February 20, 2009.

[59] Each camp has two police stations. Human Rights Watch email exchange with UNHCR, Geneva, February 20, 2009.

[60] An administrative police post located on the edge of Hagadera camp.

[61] Human Rights Watch interview, Hagadera, October 16, 2008.

[62] Human Rights Watch interview, Hagadera camp, October 15, 2008.

[63] Human Rights Watch interview, Eastleigh, Nairobi, October 20, 2008.

[64] Human Rights Watch email exchange with UNHCR, Geneva, February 20, 2009.

[65] Section 25(f), 2006 Refugees Act. Section 25(f) refers to powers the Minster of State for Immigration and Registration of Persons has under section 15(2) of the act to specify areas as "designated areas." However, these powers are set out in section 16(2).

[66] Human Rights Watch email exchange with UNHCR, Geneva, February 20, 2009.

[67] Confidential Human Rights Watch interview, Dadaab, October 15, 2008.

[68] Human Rights Watch interview in Eastleigh, October 21, 2008.

[69] Human Rights Watch interview, Eastleigh, October 21, 2008.

[70] Human Rights Watch interview, Eastleigh, October 20, 2008.

[71]See textbox opposite page 1.

Note -- Picture: Refugee camp locations (from HRW Report)

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About The Author: Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis - is Orientalist, Assyriologist, Egyptologist, Iranologist, Islamologist, Historian and Political Scientist. Dr. Megalommatis, 52, is the author of 12 books, dozens of scholarly articles, hundreds of encyclopedia entries, and thousands of articles. He speaks, reads and writes more than 15, modern and ancient, languages.

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